What is natural law?

When Evangelicals think about natural law they often imagine cerebral intellectuals attempting to use reason and logic to invent or try to prove moral principles. They are appropriately skeptical of such exercises. With a little ingenuity and skill, the intellectually self-confident can defend just about any moral conclusion on the basis of reason. Catholics in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas might take natural law to some very conservative conclusions, but the Enlightenment launched us in a liberal trajectory that has taken us far to the left of anything recognizable to Aquinas. As cynics point out, reason alone does not confirm the most basic principles, such as human dignity or equality, which depend on theological affirmations regarding the creation of human beings in the image of God.

Reformed theologians can be quick to jump on the bandwagon. Given human depravity and sin, natural law is not a reliable epistemology (i.e., means of moral knowledge). All it does is to render human beings accountable to God (i.e., Paul’s argument in Romans 1). It has little constructive value for human life.

On the other hand, as theologians like David VanDrunen have demonstrated, the older Reformed tradition actually followed Thomas Aquinas in finding an important role for natural law. To be sure, Calvin and others emphasized that natural law has no power to save. Only the gospel of Christ – special revelation – can do that. But when it came to political and social moral practices these theologians could often wax eloquently about the achievements and wisdom of pagan philosophers like Plato and pagan societies like ancient Rome. And Calvin repeatedly affirmed that all truth comes from the Holy Spirit, wherever it is found.

But what is natural law? And what do we make of the fact that natural law can be and has been claimed as the moral basis for virtually everything – including slavery, racism, and the Nazi genocide of the Jews? Since I’ve started this blog a number of people have written me to ask me just this question. What is natural law?

This is not the focus of my work, and I have no scholarly response prepared. VanDrunen is currently working on a book that articulates a biblical theology of natural law, and I think it will be quite good. It will certainly move the discussion forward. For now, however, I want to make a few points about what natural law is, what it isn’t, and why it is useful in our current cultural context.

First, contrary to popular belief, natural law is not first and foremost a process of reasoning or a means of attaining moral knowledge. It is, rather, the objective moral order of creation as designed by God. It exists whether or not any human beings understand it or can attain to it, and whether or not human theories of natural law have any correspondence to it. It is inherently covenantal, in that it expresses the moral relationship God has created between himself and human beings, among human beings, and between human beings and the rest of creation. As an objective standard built into creation, it is distinct from positive human law (i.e., laws humans have established whether consistent with natural law or not) as well as from revealed divine law as recorded or written (i.e., the Torah, the Ten Commandments, the New Testament), although the latter is always consistent with and often includes much of the natural law.

Second, knowledge of the natural law does not necessarily depend on reason or logic because it is written on the human heart (Romans 2). In that sense it is often intuitive, expressed by human beings in their social and political interactions whether they are aware of it or not. Human beings can suppress some of the principles of natural law (i.e., that God should be worshiped or human life preserved) but they can never consistently suppress all of it (i.e., that human life should be preserved and the flourishing of social order promoted). Evidence of natural law is found in what philosophers and theologians used to call the law of nations – the universal or near universal practices of human beings that are essential to social survival. But intuition, reason, experience, science, and special revelation all provide some evidence of the natural law; none of them reveal it independently, or fully.

Third, although there are areas in which contemporary modern society flagrantly ignores natural law, there are also numerous commitments of the liberal West that express its enduring moral relevance. Such expressions include much of the content of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other similar charters, and they also include some of the principles found in more overtly religious documents like the American Declaration of Independence. The moral authority of these documents, even in societies like the United States that feature significant political, cultural, and moral divisions, indicate the widespread acceptance of a natural moral order, however we might disagree about what that order looks like in practice.

Finally, the primary role of natural law in contemporary American political and civil society is not to solve our political disputes or even to adjudicate between our conflicting arguments. In a perfect world, of course, natural law would achieve such ends, but as the critics rightly point out, in the world we have human depravity and sin is simply too great to warrant such optimism. The primary role of natural law is therefore not to serve as a means to moral knowledge but as a basis for moral conversation. By speaking in terms of natural law – or in terms of language of rights and responsibilities, liberty and equality, justice and peace – we testify to the fact that as human beings we are moral creatures obligated to live together according to standards of mutual accountability, order, and basic justice. We acknowledge that although we might often disagree on very important things, we also agree on many important things. We recognize that we have the ability to work through our disagreements in a manner conducive of at least a modicum of peace and justice, and that therefore we should not be in a constant state of war.

What happens if we reject natural law? What happens if we simply appeal to our personal preferences, our religious convictions, or to the revealed standard that our religious community uniquely affirms to be the word of God? We lose all common ground. We see the breakdown of conversation. Politics becomes nothing more than a power struggle. Government loses its moral authority in the eyes of its subjects. There becomes no reason why my neighbor (or enemy) should listen to me when I seek to persuade him that a certain principle or practice is morally essential to our common good.

There is much more that could be said, but perhaps this is a good start. Natural law will certainly not solve all of our problems. But we cannot do without it.

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About Matthew Tuininga

Matthew Tuininga is a student of political theology and a doctoral candidate in Ethics at Emory University. He is a licensed preacher in the United Reformed Churches of North America.

Posted on February 4, 2013, in Calvin, David VanDrunen, Natural Law, Rights and tagged , , , , . Bookmark the permalink. 10 Comments.

  1. Thanks for this, Matt. I feel like a robust conception of natural law was something the reformers kicked away in their break with the scholastic teachings of catholicism. But they shouldn’t have. We pushed away too much in that break, threw too much of the baby out with the bath water. I think a robust theory of natural law can be seen to be plausible by pointing out how many normative truths are evident from consideration of various thing’s natures. We see someone missing a limb and we can just tell that she wasn’t supposed to be like that. She was supposed to have four limbs. Reflection then reveals that this normative claim–that she’s supposed to have four limbs–isn’t based on anything unique to her. Rather, it’s a general truth about human beings. A little more reflection reveals that this normative claim is essentially true of human beings; human beings are by nature supposed to have four limbs. If you grant this much, it starts getting plausible that at least many moral laws (like, ceteris paribus, one shouldn’t remove a human being’s limbs) flow from the nature of human beings.

    I’d love to see more protestants–and especially reformed folks–getting back on board with robust, nature-based accounts of moral normativity.

  2. Thanks Paul, I think I agree. Are you suggesting, however, that the reformers threw out natural law (they clearly did not; Protestants did that later, as VanDrunen and Stephen Grabil argue), or simply that they abandoned too much of the substantive scholastic version of it?

  3. Yeah, I don’t think the reformers themselves rejected natural law. My sense is that they retained some version of it, even while rejecting much of the scholastic version of it. I doubt that, at that point, if they had rejected natural law wholesale, they would have had any other viable metaethical conception to fall back on. But it seems plausible to me that the thin-to-non-existent conception of natural law had by protestants today has its roots, to a significant degree, in the reformers’ rejection of scholasticism (and in the minimalistic rights theories founded by Grotius and Pufendorf, which bore little resemblance to the robust theories of the scholastics).

    You might find portions of J. B. Schneewind’s The Invention of Autonomy to be interesting and relevant to these issues. He gives a history of the transition from scholastic natural law into the minimal theories of the early modern period. One of the best books I’ve ever read (part of).

  4. The problem I find in your exposition of natural law is ubiquitous in Reformed works on the subject—“natural law” is substantially underdeveloped. Not to be belligerent, but in my experience reading contemporary Reformed works on natural law it is almost as if none of the writers have ever had a course in metaethics, or are familiar with the field and hence what an explanation of an ethical theory should attempt to satisfy.

    As you describe NL, it is an “objective moral order of creation as designed by God” and that knowledge of it “does not necessarily depend on reason or logic.”

    The major problem is that your formulation does not yet rule out any ethical theory. NL as you formulate it is compatible with, so far as I can tell, any account of the metaphysics of moral properties, as well as any moral epistemology, as well as any normative theory! One could hold to NL as you formulated it and hold to a naturalism about moral properties and an act utilitarian about the right. Or, one could be a non-naturalist about those moral properties and a Kantian about the right. Or, one could hold to a naturalistic Aristotelian account of the good (e.g., Foot), etc. All of these theories can be translated into talk of moral rights, or they can leave talk of moral rights about completely, and all of those theories can be developed as the explanation of what the “objective moral order of creation as designed by God amounts to.” So thus far you haven’t actually said what NL is (beyond ruling out various forms of antirealism, maybe).

    So this is what is bizarre to me about the NL debate in contemporary Reformed circles: proponents of NL want Reformed folk to embrace NL as, apparently, an ethical theory. Critics of NL think NL as an ethical theory is false. No one, however, ever says what that ethical theory is. No one ever actually gives the necessary account of moral properties, or moral epistemology (beyond slogans like “written on the heart”) and no one gives the necessary account of what normative theory results.

    I am also inclined to think NL doesn’t really matter in ethics, even to people like DVD. If you’ve read DVD’s book Bioethics and the Christian Life, you will be hard pressed to find any NL argument in it. Any critic of NL could have written an identical work. And if you’ve read the exchanges between Kloosterman and DVD on NL, Kloosterman at various points asks DVD for a NL law argument. DVD has nothing. Kloosterman asks for what, say, the best NL argument against abortion would be, and DVD has nothing. So why should anyone even take NL seriously?

  5. Matthew Tuininga

    pba, I appreciate your comment. I think your criticism, however, presupposes itself. You assume that NL proponents view natural law as an ethical theory, a moral epistemology, and then find it to be underdeveloped. But the foundational view I am articulating here (and that a scholar like VanDrunen has articulated) does not understand natural law first and foremost as an ethical theory or a moral epistemology. It simply understands natural law as the moral order. One does not need to have a developed theory of ethical knowledge in order to affirm this.

    As you note, then, there are various theories of natural law, one being Aristotle’s, another Kant’s, etc. Affirming the existence and importance of natural law does not immediately adjudicate between the various theories of natural law. I would argue that Scripture itself does not teach a “theory of natural law”, though it does teach a theology of natural law. Yet just as Scripture and Christianity do not offer definitive theories of biology, law, or political science, and yet those areas of knowledge and human experience are still elements of general revelation normed by Scripture, so the same is the case with natural moral knowledge.

    I think your final question can be answered by taking it to its absurd conclusion. What you are really asking is, why should anyone take morality seriously?

  6. Thanks for replying, Matt. You write,

    “But the foundational view I am articulating here (and that a scholar like VanDrunen has articulated) does not understand natural law first and foremost as an ethical theory or a moral epistemology. It simply understands natural law as the moral order. One does not need to have a developed theory of ethical knowledge in order to affirm this.”

    Maybe you should re-read my post, as I think you’ve misunderstood a lot of it. Depending on what you mean, every sufficiently developed ethical theory has an account of the “moral order” to the extent that the moral order has anything to do with a normative theory of ethics, or a metaphysical account of moral properties, and so on. Every ethical theory has some “moral order” or other, including anti-realist theories, so again you’ve describe NL theory in a way that does not rule out any ethical theory so far as I can tell. My problem is again/still pretty simple: No one in the Reformed NL debate, so far as I have seen, explains in any sufficient detail what a natural law theory of ethics is, and when they do attempt to explain it they do so in ways so vague and broad that almost any ethical theory thus counts as a NL theory.

    Second, is it true that “one does not need to have a develops theory of ethical knowledge in order to affirm this?” If a naturalist argues for an ethical theory that claims that certain evolutionary functions give us normative functions—a type of evolutionary ethics—you might well ask how they know some evolutionary function, if there are any, are indeed normative. And if they say “one does not need to have a develops theory of ethical knowledge in order to affirm this” wouldn’t you be a little puzzled?

    Finally, I found your reply to my question “So why should anyone even take NL seriously?” pretty disingenuous, given what I’ve said (which maybe deserves a re-read). As I see it, here is a parallel conversation, instead with an evolutionary ethicist instead of a NL proponent: I ask the naturalist what they mean by “evolutionary functions” and what it means to say (and how they know) that some are normative. The naturalist gives me a non-answer (maybe he says something like, “the normative evolutionary functions are simply the moral order, and one does not need to have a developed theory of ethical knowledge in order to affirm this,” or something similarly unhelpful). So, I’m inclined to reply, if the naturalist is unable to explain his theory in any useful detail—let alone detail sufficient to have a worked out ethical theory—I do not see why it should be (or how it could be) taken seriously. And then (this is the point I tried to make in my last paragraph of the original reply) imagine you read a work of applied ethics by that naturalist and it made no use of evolutionary ethics. You might begin to wonder if that naturalist even took evolutionary ethics seriously, or what use it is even if it could be sufficiently developed into an ethical theory. That is my experience reading DVD’s work, as mentioned, where little to no NL arguments actually seem to appear and where, in replies to reviews of his works, he is still unable to make NL arguments for applied conclusions even when pressed by his critics.

  7. pba, Thanks for this. But as I reread what you are saying here, I don’t think I’ve misunderstood you at all. VanDrunen has not set forth natural law as an “ethical theory”, nor have I. Nor did Calvin, which distinguished him from Aquinas, or from the New Natural Law Theory today. We have been open about this, so it seems odd to criticize us for failing to do what we declared up front we were not attempting to do.

    Now it may be the case (I think it is) that theologians need to do more work articulating a proper approach to natural law, a broad, multifaceted and flexible approach that would exclude certain ethical theories. But that is not necessarily the task of every theologian or ethicist who is trying to demonstrate that we need a recovery of natural law thinking. Similarly, an exegetical theologian (like VanDrunen, in his forthcoming work) might set the boundaries for natural law thinking, but couldn’t go beyond that without shifting into other fields.

    To sum it all up; I agree with you that work needs to be done in this area. I don’t see that as a flaw of VanDrunen’s work, because not everyone can do everything, and the main point he is trying to make stands on its own, even more, is the prerequisite for the sort of work you want to see done.

    So if you are encouraging us to accept VanDrunen’s basic argument and now move forward and make something of it, I wholeheartedly agree with you. Now you need to find the scholars willing to do this.

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